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Abstract
We report laboratory data on earned wealth eﬀects in a series
of anonymous dictator bargaining games. In addition to a standard
(baseline) treatment in which the wealth to be bargained over was de-
termined by the experimenter, we conduct treatments in which either
the dictator or the receiver earned the wealth used in a subsequent
bargaining phase. In our baseline treatment, we observe the standard
result: on average, dictators oﬀer receivers 20%. In treatments where
the sender (i.e. dictator) earned wealth, we observe the theoretic pre-
diction of zero oﬀers to receivers. In treatments where the receiver
earned wealth, we observe many hyper-fair oﬀers (i.e. oﬀers greater
than 50%). We interpret these results as evidence of the importance
of property rights in determining individuals’ social preferences.
JEL Classification: C70, C91, D63
Keywords : Dictator Games, Earned Wealth Eﬀects,
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1 Introduction
Experiments have demonstrated the presence of “other regarding behavior”
and “social preferences” in which individuals reveal a preference over not
only their own payoﬀs, but also those of others. For example, in simple ulti-
matum and dictator games where standard theory predicts near zero oﬀers to
receivers, senders typically oﬀer in excess of 20% of their endowments. These
results are strikingly robust across varying degrees of anonymity (Hoﬀman
et al., 1996) and diﬀerent cultures (Henrich et al., 2001; Roth et al., 1991).
The insights gleaned from these experiments have motivated various theoret-
ical approaches characterizing social preferences (see Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and the intentions
underlying individual behavior (see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Mc-
Cabe and Smith, 2000; Rabin, 1993).
Experimental participants’ displayed preferences for fairness, reciprocity,
and social welfare are multi-faceted; motivated by many aspects of the deci-
sion environment and the context of interactions. Here, we test the power of
asset legitimacy and wealth entitlement through a series of dictator games
in which one party must earn the wealth used in bargaining. (Thus, our ex-
periments are in spirit similar to those conducted by Cherry et al, 2002, and
Ruﬄe, 1998.) In particular, we conduct bargaining experiments in which
receivers exert eﬀort to earn money. This earnings stage is followed by a
bargaining stage in which an anonymous dictator must allocate the money
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between herself and the receiver, knowing that the receiver has exerted eﬀort
to earn this wealth. Note that this treatment mirrors a trust game akin to
that of Berg et al. (1995) in which the receiver’s exertion of (costly) eﬀort
indicates trust in the dictator not expropriating the wealth via a zero oﬀer.
Results from our receivers earning treatment are compared to a baseline (un-
earned wealth) dictator game treatment and a treatment in which dictators
must exert eﬀort to earn money.
We ﬁnd that legitimacy of assets plays a crucial role in the way individ-
uals bargain and display their concerns for others. Relative to the standard
dictator game, we observe the theoretically predicted zero oﬀer in our dic-
tators earning treatments (demonstrating the robustness of the results in
Cherry et al., 2002). Thus, dictators’ perceived entitlement to wealth ef-
fectively eliminated any aversion to payoﬀ inequities. On the other hand,
dictators in our receivers earnings treatment allocate signiﬁcantly more to
receivers when they perceive receivers as entitled to the money through their
eﬀorts. Indeed, the fact that receivers exert any eﬀort to earn money (money
which they were fully aware could be expropriated by the dictator) indicates
an expectation that the dictator will not follow the theoretic prediction of
allocating receivers nothing.1 One may interpret this as a strong indication
of positive reciprocity in which the degree of reciprocity (as demonstrated by
dictators’ substantial oﬀers to receivers) is increasing in the perceived enti-
1The distribution of receiver’s scores suggest that some receivers did indeed exert sig-
niﬁcant eﬀort (see ﬁgure 1).
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tlement of receivers (as inferred from receivers’ earnings eﬀorts): As receivers
exert greater eﬀort in the earnings phase (and thereby create greater wealth),
we observe an increase in the number of “hyper-fair” oﬀers made by senders
(i.e. oﬀers greater than 50%).
We attribute these decisions to the strength of asset legitimacy in creating
perceived property rights among participants, a characteristic of the decision
environment which appears to augment “other regarding” behavior. Most
importantly, our results demonstrate the importance of asset entitlements
in reducing individuals’ attention to outcome based fairness at the expense
of intention based fairness. That dictators who earned wealth uniformly
extended zero oﬀers indicates that the earned wealth eﬀect trumps other
regarding behavior associated with outcome based fairness (e.g. aversion
to payoﬀ inequities). On the other hand, earned wealth eﬀects appear to
deepen the positive reciprocity exhibited by dictators (i.e. intention based
fairness): Receivers who generated greater wealth beneﬁted from greater
positive reciprocity on the part of dictators. Note that since earnings eﬀorts
(by either dictators or receivers) are sunk costs at the time of bargaining, our
results provide strong evidence of the importance of sunk costs in determining
the manner in which “fair” allocations are construed.2
We proceeds as follows: section 2 outlines our experiment. As a bench-
mark, we conduct a canonical dictator game under anonymity against which
2Thus our results are consistent with the literature in equity theory (see Walster et al.,
1978). Konow (2000) ﬁnds experimental support for equity theory and diﬀerences in the
ways individuals interpret fair allocations.
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we measure our other results.3 We conduct two earnings treatments in which
either the dictator (sender) or the receiver must exert eﬀort to earn wealth
to be subsequently used in a bargaining phase. Section 3 presents our re-
sults. For the earnings treatment in which dictators exert eﬀort, we observe
100% support for the theoretic prediction based on self-interested prefer-
ences. Strikingly, when it is receivers who must exert eﬀort to earn wealth,
oﬀers are signiﬁcantly higher relative to the baseline dictator game. Indeed,
42% of oﬀers are hyper-fair. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses our results in terms
of recent research on fairness and reciprocity, the legitimacy of assets, and
found money eﬀects. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Participants
Participants were recruited from the student body at our university. We
conducted 7 sessions consisting of 168 bargaining pairs. Participants were
randomly divided into two groups (A and B) with each group assigned to
a separate room. When recruited, individuals were told the room and time
they should arrive. Each group arrived at diﬀerent times and individuals
remained in their assigned rooms for the experiment’s duration. Finally, each
3The anonymity in our experiment is slightly weaker than the double blind procedure
of Hoﬀman et al. (1996). The sessions were conducted entirely by graduate research
assistants who we veriﬁed were not familiar with any of the participants. Despite this, our
results match closely with the results of Hoﬀman et al. (1996) and Cherry et al. (2002)
under the double blind protocol. See appendix A for a description of our protocols.
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group was dismissed from the experiment at diﬀerent times. The objective of
these procedures was to eliminate any contact between participants. Further,
participants in each room were only allowed to talk with the experiment’s
administrators.
Earnings Treatments
To create a sense of asset entitlement or legitimacy, some subjects partici-
pated in an earnings stage prior to any bargaining.
In our receiver earnings treatment, individuals in group B had the oppor-
tunity to take an exam of 20 questions culled from the Graduate Management
Admissions Test (GMAT) and the Graduate Record Examination (GRE).4
Based on their performance, individuals in group B earned a sum of money to
be used in the bargaining stage of the experiment. Speciﬁcally, if individuals
in group B correctly answered between 0 and 8 questions, $10 was generated;
if they correctly answered between 9 and 14 questions, $20 was generated; if
they correctly answered 15 or more questions, $40 was generated.
In the bargaining stage, an individual in group A was given information
about the exam and the resulting sum of money. This individual had to
allocate the amount of earned wealth through a one-shot dictator game.
That is, individuals in group A decided how much of the money generated
by individuals in group B would be kept for themselves and how much would
be returned to the individual who had “earned” the money.
4Copies of the instructions and the exam are provided in appendices B and C.
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In our dictator (sender) earnings treatment, individuals in group A took
the same exam and faced the same earnings (incentive) structure. This
wealth was used in the bargaining stage where group A individuals made
oﬀers to group B individuals.
In our baseline dictator treatment, no exam was administered and group
A dictators received randomly determined wealth levels of either $10, $20,
or $40 to allocate between themselves and group B receivers. This followed
previous experiments in which the wealth to be distributed was determined
by the experimenter.
3 Results
To begin, we consider the theoretical predictions from the above games. In
all three treatments, standard theory (based on pure self-interest) predicts
the dictator will allocate nothing to the receiver and, in the dictator earnings
treatment, exert eﬀort on the exam to yield a higher level of earned wealth.
Thus, the dictator should keep everything and receivers should receive payoﬀs
of zero. Given the dictator’s behavior, in the receiver earnings treatment one
would expect individuals in group B to exert no eﬀort on the exam, thereby
correctly answering (on average) between 0 and 8 questions and generating
$10.5
Figure 1 presents the distributions of exam scores in the dictator earnings
5Each question had possible answers labelled A through E. An individual guessing on
each question would expect, on average, to receive 4 correct answers.
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and receivers treatments. Notice that the distribution of scores for subjects
in the dictator earnings treatment is quite normal, while the distribution of
scores for the subjects in the receiver earnings treatment is almost bi-modal.
This suggests that some receivers “trusted” that dictators would reciprocate
their eﬀort on the test by allocating them a larger share of the pie than they
would have otherwise. Notably, the proportion of receivers who scored 11
or more (and thereby mirror the earnings behavior in our dictators earning
treatment) is 66%. This is very similar to the proportion who choose the
trust strategy in McCabe et al. (2003).6
We provide the cumulative distributions of oﬀers by wealth level ($10,
$20, and $40) in Figures 2, 3 and 4.7 Figure 5 compares the cumulative
distributions across the three diﬀerent wealth levels for the receiver earnings
treatment, while Figure 6 presents the frequency distributions for the base-
line and receiver earnings treatments by wealth level. Table 1 presents the
mean, median and percentage oﬀers from our baseline and receiver earnings
treatments.
In the baseline dictator treatments, the theoretically predicted “zero of-
fer” occurred in 35% of $10, 26% of $20, and 11% of $40 wealth levels. This
is consistent with previous dictator game experiments (see Camerer, 2003).
6Recall that the $10 wealth level could be obtained with minimal eﬀort and persists
for scores of 8 or less.
7RE represents the receiver earning treatment, DE represents the dictator (sender)
earnings treatment, and Baseline represents the baseline (i.e. unearned wealth) treatment.
We had no $10 wealth levels under the dictator earnings treatment: all dictators in this
treatment exerted eﬀort suﬃcient to earn at least $20. The CDF labelled DE in Figure 2
is simulated based on the data presented in Cherry et al. (2002), Figure 1 (p. 1220).
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Our dictator earnings treatment follows the theoretic prediction perfectly:
100% of dictators allocated nothing to receivers (Figures 3 and 4). This
demonstrates the robustness of the results in Cherry et al. (2002): the le-
gitimizing of dictators’ claims over wealth increased the occurrence of the
theoretic predictions over the baseline treatment. Again, that none of our
dictators in the dictator earnings treatments scored less than 11 (the $10
wealth level cut-oﬀ) suggests that they exerted signiﬁcant eﬀort on the test.
Our receiver earnings treatment paints a more striking picture of the im-
portance and role of asset legitimacy. The results indicate that not only do
individuals in group B exert signiﬁcant eﬀort on the exam (as evidenced by
Figure 1), dictators in group A reward this eﬀort, in some cases oﬀering the
entire amount of the money earned by the individual in group B. Legitimiz-
ing the receiver’s claim to the wealth with the earnings stage dramatically
reduced dictators’ self-interested behavior, with zero oﬀers arising in none
(0%) of the $40, one (3%) of the $20 , and six (38%) of the $10 wealth levels.
Fisher’s exact p and Wilcoxon (W ) tests indicate that the distributions of
oﬀers (Figures 2, 3, and 4) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the earnings
and baseline treatments for the $20 wealth level (Fisher’s exact p = 0.001;
W = −3.803, p = 0.0001) and $40 wealth level (Fisher’s exact p < 0.001;
W = −5.114, p < 0.0001), but not for the $10 wealth level (Fisher’s exact
p = 1.000; W = −0.149, p = 0.8813). That there is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the baseline and receiver earnings treatment for the $10 wealth
level supports our asset legitimacy hypothesis: Receivers who do not exert
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a veriﬁable level of eﬀort are treated in the same way as receivers in the
endowment baseline treatment. Consistent with results in Berg et al. (1995)
and McCabe et al. (2003), when dictators observe no veriﬁable evidence of
receivers’ trust (i.e. earnings eﬀort in the face of potential expropriation),
dictators do not reciprocate as with higher wealth levels.
Moreover, the incidence and degree of positive reciprocity was increased in
the receiver earnings treatment, with hyper-fair oﬀers arising in twenty (63%)
of the $40, eleven (31%) of the $20, and two (13%) of the $10 wealth levels.
This contrasts sharply with the behavior of dictators in standard (unearned)
wealth treatments: No dictator oﬀers more than 50% of (unearned) wealth
to receivers, regardless of wealth level.8 The behavior of our dictators in the
receiver earning treatment is inconsistent with most outcome based models
of fairness but is consistent with intention based models of fairness.
Dictators’ positive reciprocity is also evidenced by the wealth eﬀect ob-
served in our receiver earnings treatment. This wealth eﬀect implies that
greater levels of eﬀort exerted by receivers (as evidenced by higher wealth
levels) are rewarded not only with larger oﬀers in absolute value, as is the
case for the baseline, but also larger percentages of the total pie (see Table
1). Both the Kruskal-Wallis (KW ) and Fisher’s exact p tests for equal-
ity of populations suggest that the distributions of oﬀers across wealth lev-
els in the receiver earnings treatment (Figures 5 and 6) are highly signif-
88This is also true in the baseline treatments from Cherry et al. (2002) and Ruﬄe
(1998). Other dictator experiments observe a small number of oﬀers in excess of 50%. See
Andreoni et al. (2003) and Forsythe et al. (1994).
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icant (KWχ2(2) = 19.538, p = 0.001; Fisher’s exact p < 0.001). Thus
we can reject the hypothesis that receivers’ eﬀorts did not matter in the
decision-making of dictators. In contrast, there is no signiﬁcant wealth eﬀect
in the baseline treatments (KWχ2(2) = 0.067, p = 0.9669, Fisher’s exact
p = 0.730).
Comparing wealth levels across the receiver earning treatments in pairs
suggests that oﬀers made under the $40 wealth level are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from those made under both the $10 and $20 wealth levels. However, Fisher’s
exact test is unable to rule out the possibility that the median oﬀer under the
$10 wealth level is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the median oﬀer under the $20
wealth level.9 Both Figures 5 and 6 show that these three distributions are
quite diﬀerent with the $20 wealth level falling in between the $10 and $40
wealth levels. Notice that in Figure 5 (the cumulative distribution diagram)
the $20 wealth level is very similar to the $40 wealth level for low oﬀers and
very similar to the $10 wealth level for the high oﬀers. Figure 6 provides
another view of the diﬀerences between wealth levels. Notice that in the
receiver earnings treatment, the modal oﬀer is zero for the $10 wealth level,
50% for the $20 wealth level, and 75% for the $40 wealth level. In contrast,
9Fisher’s exact p = 0.185, W = −2.486, p = 0.0129 comparing $10 and $20; Fisher’s
exact p = 0.001, W = −3.824, p = 0.0001 comparing $10 and $40; Fisher’s exact p = 0.003,
W = −3.131, p = 0.0017 comparing $20 and $40.
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there is no discernable wealth eﬀect in our baseline treatment.10
As in the comparison of oﬀers under each wealth level between the receiver
earnings and baseline treatments, this wealth eﬀect implies that receivers
earning larger endowments are rewarded by dictators via larger oﬀers. Since
a receiver can generate $10 with minimal eﬀort, dictators do not reward
these individuals with the same type of oﬀers made when either $20 or $40
is generated (i.e. more fair or hyper-fair oﬀers). Thus, it appears that the
strength of asset entitlement accruing to receivers and dictators’ positive
reciprocity are sensitive not only to the mere fact that eﬀort was exerted
in generating the bargaining “pie,” but also to the inferred level of eﬀort
exerted.11
4 Discussion
Asset legitimacy plays a crucial role in decision-making, serving as a counter-
weight against individuals’ attention to the payoﬀs of others. Thus, the impli-
cations drawn from more standard bargaining experiments regarding fairness
concerns and inequity aversion should be tempered against the inﬂuence of
“found money” eﬀects (Arkes et al., 1994; Thaler, 1999). As demonstrated
10For the diﬀerence between the $10 and $20 wealth levels, Wilcoxon and Fisher’s exact
p = 0.544, W = 0.237, p = 0.8130; for the diﬀerence between $10 and $40 wealth levels,
Wilcoxon and Fisher’s exact p = 0.745, W = 0.119, p = 0.9056; for the diﬀerence between
$20 and $40 wealth levels, Wilcoxon and Fisher’s exact p = 1.000, W = −0.174, p =
0.8620.
11If dictators did not believe that responders had exerted more eﬀort to achieve a higher
score we would not expect to see signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the baseline and the
receiver earning treatment. This is consistent with the results from Ruﬄe (1998).
13
by Cherry et al. (2002), legitimizing assets via earning by dictators can al-
ter the ways in which individuals construe equity and fairness, resulting in
behaviors that appear to defy the presence of social preferences.
Our results suggest that asset legitimacy goes both ways, creating an
ersatz property right that mitigates a dictator’s self-interest during bargain-
ing. Not only do individuals recognize their own entitlement to assets, but
they recognize the entitlements of others. In fact, our results indicate that
this observance of others’ “rights” to assets is increasing in the strength of
asset legitimacy (i.e. the eﬀort exerted in earning the assets). Moreover,
individuals expect that others will recognize their entitlements: Receivers
in our receiver earnings treatment exerted signiﬁcant eﬀort, although they
had no way to guarantee this would be reﬂected in their ﬁnal payoﬀs. From
the perspective of dictators, the eﬀorts of receivers created a motivation for
hyper-fair oﬀers, even though these eﬀorts are sunk costs incurred by an
anonymous individual.12
Thus, we observe a dichotomous eﬀect of earned wealth in dictator game
bargaining. First, individuals’ own entitlements to assets appear to dom-
inate over the fairness concerns characterized in outcome based models of
other regarding behavior (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). Secondly, others’ entitlements to assets appear to amplify individu-
als’ observed adherence to intention based models of fairness (Dufwenberg
12Our results provide a new interpretation of why sunk costs may matter to individuals
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980), even if these costs are incurred by another.
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and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993). Receivers’ earning eﬀorts reveal a trust
in dictators not opting to fully expropriate the available wealth. This is re-
ciprocally rewarded with greater oﬀers (akin to greater trust yielding greater
trustworthiness; see Berg et al., 1995; Fehr et al., 1993). This demonstrates
how earned wealth eﬀects inﬂuence outcome based fairness (which disappears
in our dictator earnings treatment) and intention based fairness (which ap-
pears to be heightened in our receiver earnings treatment).
Our experiments complement the dictator experiments of Cherry et al.
(2002) and Ruﬄe (1998). In Cherry et al. (2002), dictators (not receivers)
earned wealth via a 17 question exam. In these experiments, legitimizing
assets in this way resulted in 95% support for the theoretical zero oﬀer.13
In Ruﬄe (1998), receivers were ranked by their performance on a general
knowledge quiz in which participants scoring in the top half of the score
distribution were allocated $10 with the remainder allocated $4. As in our
results, Ruﬄe (1998) ﬁnds that oﬀers made to receivers in the top of the
score distribution (mean oﬀer 45%) exceed those made to receivers in the
bottom of the score distribution (mean oﬀer 23%) and in treatments in which
endowments are randomly determined (mean oﬀer 34%).
Our results provide stronger evidence as to the import of perceived prop-
erty rights in decision-making. The strength of our results (particularly mean
oﬀers exceeding those in Ruﬄe, 1998, see Table 1) is due to earnings based
on absolute, rather than relative, performance and the size of incentives. In
13Similar results are presented in Cherry (2001).
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particular, the use of absolute score to determine earnings implies that (in
our context) dictators have a stronger signal of receivers’ eﬀorts than under a
relative earning mechanism. This, combined with larger wealth levels, yields
stronger evidence of the import of perceived property rights and dictators’
“gratefulness” to receivers in determining senders’ behavior. The presence
of a wealth eﬀect in our receivers earning treatment and the absence of any
diﬀerence between oﬀers made to receivers earning $10 and our $10 baseline
treatment indicates that the “gratefulness” of dictators towards receivers is
increasing in the inferred eﬀorts of the latter.14
5 Conclusion
Many aspects of a decision environment inﬂuence how individuals perceive
fairness in that environment. The experiments conducted here demonstrate
how perceived property rights (asset legitimacy or asset entitlement) have
a strong eﬀect on individuals’ behavior, and hence their demonstrated pref-
erences over fairness. This points to a need to consider the import of asset
legitimacy in models of individual decision-making. Asset legitimacy (as per-
ceived property rights) appears to be something individuals readily observe
in our experiments. Moreover, the other regarding behavior evidenced in our
14Other experiments, notably Ga¨chter and Riedl (2003), ﬁnd further evidence of asset
entitlement or “moral property rights.” In these experiments, bargaining pairs consider
a split of resources based on proportional (i.e. relative) performance as more fair than
equal split allocations. Sonnegard (1996) ﬁnds that behavior in bargaining experiments is
sensitive to framing eﬀects in which property rights are reinforced by reminding senders
of their “right to exploit their bargaining power.”
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results is most consistent with intention, rather than outcome, based mod-
els of fairness. These results should inform our models of social preferences
and reciprocity by demonstrating another aspect of how individuals construe
fairness and evaluate the welfare of others.
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A Experimental Protocols
The following protocol was observed for each receiver earnings treatment.
These protocols were adapted from the double-blind protocols in Hoﬀman
et al. (1996). Our intent was to provide as much anonymity as possible.
Due to the absence of a Canadian one dollar bill, following the double-blind
procedures in Hoﬀman et al. (1996) was not feasible.
1. The rules were read aloud to individuals in each group.15 Several warm-
up questions were asked to ensure individuals understood the structure
of the game, particularly the bargaining stage. After the instructions
were read and any questions were answered, the experimenter left the
room and two student monitors entered to administer the experiment.16
2. Individuals in group B were given exams and told that money would be
generated based on the following (incentive) structure: if they correctly
answered at least 8 questions, $10 would be generated; if they correctly
answered between 9 and 14 questions, $20 would be generated; if they
correctly answered between 15 and 20 questions, $40 would be gener-
ated. Individuals were given 45 minutes to complete the exam. After
completing the exam, the monitors marked the exams and gave each
participant a receipt with their randomly assigned participant num-
ber, their exam score, and the amount of money corresponding to their
exam score. This receipt was retained by the individual in group B. A
second receipt was produced, indicating only the funds generated and
the participant’s number, and placed in an envelope.
3. Individuals in group A were asked to arrive 45 minutes later than in-
dividuals in group B. These individuals were read the instructions and
any questions were answered. Each individual received a copy of the
exam participants in group B had taken and was given a maximum of 10
minutes to review the exam. In addition, individuals in group A were
given a copy of the payment schedule used to determine the amount
of money associated with exam scores.17 Although not mentioned to
15To avoid semantic diﬃculties, the words “earned” and “allocated” were never used in
describing the experiment to participants.
16As individuals were arriving for the exam, the student monitors had an opportunity
to observe the participants and were asked if they knew anyone participating in the exam.
If they did, they were excluded from administering that group’s session.
17Exam scores were known only to individuals in group B.
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participants, the intent was that they would attempt to discern the
diﬃculty of the exam and the eﬀort necessary to generate each of the
possible wealth levels. After the instructions were read and materials
were distributed, the experimenter left and a student monitor entered
the room.
4. The second receipts (generated during step 2) were taken to the room
in which group A was located. Individuals in group A were randomly
matched with individuals in group B and received an envelope con-
taining a receipt indicating the amount of money generated by their
bargaining partner. On this receipt they recorded their oﬀer to the
individual in group B. The monitor produced a third receipt indicating
the initial amount of wealth (generated by an individual in group B
during step 2) and the oﬀer made by the group A bargaining partner.
These receipts were retained by individuals in group A and the second
receipts were placed in their envelopes and returned to the monitor.
Individuals in group A then were asked to complete a demographic
questionnaire and received their payoﬀs in private.
5. The second receipts, which now included information on the amount
of money generated and the oﬀers made to group B members, were
returned to group B. Each individual provided their ﬁrst receipt (pro-
duced in step 2) prior to receiving the receipt indicating their oﬀer.
This ensured proper matching of individuals with their exam perfor-
mance. Members of group B received their payoﬀs in private and were
allowed to leave approximately 15 minutes prior to individuals from
group A.
Three treatments were conducted. Our receiver earnings treatment pro-
ceeded as described above. In our dictator (sender) earnings treatment the
above protocols were observed except that individuals in group A took the
exam and generated a level of wealth (step 2) prior to making oﬀers to
individuals in group B (step 4). In our (baseline) dictator treatment, the
experiment essentially began with step 4 above (no exam was administered)
and group A dictators received receipts indicating a randomly determined
wealth level of $10, $20, or $40 to allocate between themselves and group
B receivers. This followed previous experiments in which the wealth to be
distributed was determined by the experimenter.
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B Instructions
The following instructions were used in the receiver earnings treatments.
Similar instructions were used in the other treatments.
B.1 Instructions to Receivers
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. During the experiment
you will be asked to make a number of decisions. Depending on the outcome
of your decisions, you may receive certain sums of money.
Throughout the experiment, we request that you refrain from talking with
one another. The experiment will proceed as follows:
You will be asked to complete an exam consisting of 20 questions pulled
from the GMAT and the GRE. You will have 45 minutes to complete the
exam. You may work as much or as little as you would like on the exam.
Based on your exam score, a sum of money will be assigned. Speciﬁcally,
if you correctly answer between 0 and 8 questions, you will generate $10; if
you correctly answer between 9 and 14 questions, you will generate $20; if
you correctly answer 15 or more questions, you will generate $40.
Once this amount of money is determined (by your exam score), another
participant in another room will be asked to make a decision over the dis-
tribution of this money. Speciﬁcally, the amount of money you generate will
be written on a receipt and delivered to a participant in another location
(another room in this building). This participant will have an opportunity
to review the same exam you completed to discern its diﬃculty. While she
will not know your score on the exam, she will know your endowment and
how it was determined by your score. This participant will then decide how
much of this money you will retain. That is, she will decide how of the money
you generated you will receive. She will keep the remainder.
Upon making this decision, the receipt will be returned to you, indicating
the amount of money you generated and the amount of money you will keep.
At the conclusion of the experiment you will receive this latter amount.
Thank you for participating in this experiment.
Warm-Up Exercises
1. Suppose you scored 11 on the exam, what is your endowment?
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2. If your endowment is $20 and the other participant chooses to keep $8,
how much will you receive?
3. If your endowment is $10 and you receive $6, how much does the other
person receive?
B.2 Instructions to Senders
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. During the experiment
you will be asked to make a number of decisions. Depending on the outcome
of your decisions, you may receive certain sums of money.
Throughout the experiment, we request that you refrain from talking with
one another. The experiment will proceed as follows:
In each of your folders is an exam consisting of 20 questions pulled from
the GMAT and the GRE. In a separate room, another participant has had
45 minutes to complete the same exam.
Based on this individual’s exam score, a sum of money has been gener-
ated. Speciﬁcally, if she correctly answered between 0 and 8 questions, she
generated $10; if she correctly answered between 9 and 14 questions, she
generated $20; if she correctly answered 15 or more questions, she generated
$40.
You will shortly be given an envelope. In this envelope is a receipt indi-
cating the amount of money generated by another person having taken the
exam. Although you do not have information on the individual’s score on
the exam, you can infer the range of her score from the above information.
You must decide how this money will be distributed between yourself
and the individual having taken the exam. Speciﬁcally, you may choose how
much of this money you will keep and how much will be given to the other
individual. Thus, if the other individual has generated $20 (implying her
score was between 10 and 14 correct answers) you must decide how much of
this money you will keep (an integer between $0 and $20) and how much the
other individual will keep (an integer between $0 and $20). Please note that
the amounts you and the other participant receive must sum to the amount
of money generated.
Once you have chosen how to distribute this money, complete the receipt
indicating the amount you shall receive and the amount the individual taking
the exam will receive.
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When you have made this decision, please put the receipt in the enve-
lope and return it to the experimenter. The experimenter will review your
receipt, making sure the amounts you and the other participant receive sum
to the amount of the endowment. The receipt will then be returned to the
participant having taken the exam. This participant will receive the amount
of money you indicated on the receipt. After she has been paid, you will
receive the amount you indicated on the receipt.
Thank you for participating in this experiment.
Warm-Up Exercises
1. Suppose the other participant scored 11 on the exam, what is her en-
dowment?
2. If the other participant’s endowment is $20 and you choose to keep $8,
how much will the other participant receive?
3. If the other person’s endowment is $10 and she receives $6, how much
will you taken?
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C Exam Questions
The following exam was used in all earnings treatments.
Directions: Solve the problem and indicate the best answer of the
choices given.
1. How many minutes does it take John to type y words if he types at the
rate of x words per minute?
a. x
y
b. y
x
c. 60x
y
d. y
60x
2. The size of a television screen is given as the length of the screen’s
diagonal. If the screens were ﬂat, then the area of a square 21-inch
screen would be how many square inches greater than the area of a
square 19-inch screen?
a. 2
b. 4
c. 16
d. 38
e. 40
3. The positive integer n is divisible by 25. If
√
n is greater than 25, which
of the following could be the value of n
25
?
a. 22
b. 23
c. 24
d. 25
e. 26
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Directions: In these questions, you are to classify each problem ac-
cording to the ﬁve ﬁxed answer choices, rather than ﬁnd a solution
to the problem. Each problem consists of a question and two state-
ments. You are to decide whether the information in each statement
alone is suﬃcient to answer the question or, if neither is, whether the
information in the two statements together is suﬃcient.
4. Is the integer n odd?
(a) n is divisible by 3.
(b) n is divisible by 5.
a. Statement (4a) ALONE is suﬃcient, but statement (4b) alone is
not suﬃcient.
b. Statement (4b) ALONE is suﬃcient, but statement (4a) alone is
not suﬃcient.
c. BOTH statements TOGETHER are suﬃcient, but NEITHER state-
ment ALONE is suﬃcient.
d. EACH statement ALONE is suﬃcient.
e. Statements (4a) and (4b) TOGETHER are NOT suﬃcient.
5. On Monday a certain machine ran continuously at a uniform rate to
ﬁll a production order. At what time did it completely ﬁll the order
that morning?
(a) The machine began ﬁlling the order at 9:30 a.m.
(b) The machine had ﬁlled 1
2
of the order by 10:30 a.m. and 5
6
of the
order by 11:10 a.m.
a. Statement (5a) ALONE is suﬃcient, but statement (5b) alone is
not suﬃcient.
b. Statement (5b) ALONE is suﬃcient, but statement (5a) alone is
not suﬃcient.
c. BOTH statements TOGETHER are suﬃcient, but NEITHER state-
ment ALONE is suﬃcient.
d. EACH statement ALONE is suﬃcient.
28
e. Statements (5a) and (5b) TOGETHER are NOT suﬃcient.
6. What is the number of 360-degree rotations that a bicycle wheel made
while rolling 100 meters in a straight line without slipping?
(a) The diameter of the bicycle wheel, including the tire, was 0.5
meter.
(b) The wheel made twenty 360-degree rotations per minute.
a. Statement (6a) ALONE is suﬃcient, but statement (6b) alone is
not suﬃcient.
b. Statement (6b) ALONE is suﬃcient, but statement (6a) alone is
not suﬃcient.
c. BOTH statements TOGETHER are suﬃcient, but NEITHER state-
ment ALONE is suﬃcient.
d. EACH statement ALONE is suﬃcient.
e. Statements (6a) and (6b) TOGETHER are NOT suﬃcient.
Directions: Select the best answer of the choices given.
7. Increases in the level of high-density lipoprotein (HDL) in the hu-
man bloodstream lower bloodstream-cholesterol levels by increasing the
body’s capacity to rid itself of excess cholesterol. Levels of HDL in the
bloodstream of some individuals are signiﬁcantly increased by a pro-
gram of regular exercise and weight reduction.
Which of the following can be correctly inferred from the statements
above?
a. Individuals who are underweight do not run any risk of developing
high levels of cholesterol in the bloodstream.
b. Individuals who do not exercise regularly have a high risk of de-
veloping high levels of cholesterol in the bloodstream late in life.
c. Exercise and weight reduction are the most eﬀective methods of
lowering bloodstream cholesterol levels in humans.
d. A program of regular exercise and weight reduction lowers choles-
terol levels in the bloodstream of some individuals.
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e. Only regular exercise is necessary to decrease cholesterol levels in
the bloodstream of individuals of average weight.
8. The average normal infant born in the United States weighs between
twelve and fourteen pounds at the age of three months. Therefore, if a
three-month-old child weighs only ten pounds, its weight gain has been
below the United States average.
Which of the following is a ﬂaw in the reasoning above?
a. Weight is only one measure of normal infant development.
b. Some three-month-old children weigh as much as 17 pounds.
c. It is possible for a normal child to weigh ten pounds at birth.
d. The phrase ”below average” does not necessarily mean insuﬃcient.
e. Average weight gain is not the same as average weight.
Directions: The question presents a sentence, part of which or all of
which is underlined. Beneath the sentence you will ﬁnd ﬁve ways of
phrasing the italicized part. The ﬁrst of these repeats the original; the
other four are diﬀerent. If you think the original is best, choose the
ﬁrst answer, otherwise choose one of the others.
9. In virtually all types of tissue in every animal species, dioxin induces
the production of enzymes that are the organism’s trying to metabolize,
or render harmless, the chemical that is irritating it.
a. trying to metabolize, or render harmless, the chemical that is ir-
ritating it
b. trying that it metabolize, or render harmless, the chemical irritant
c. attempt to try to metabolize, or render harmless, such a chemical
irritant
d. attempt to try and metabolize, or render harmless, the chemical
irritating it
e. attempt to metabolize, or render harmless, the chemical irritant
10. The psychologist William James believed that facial expressions not
only provide a visible sign of an emotion, actually contributing to the
feeling itself.
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a. emotion, actually contributing to the feeling itself
b. emotion but also actually contributing to the feeling itself
c. emotion but also actually contribute to the feeling itself
d. emotion; the also actually contribute to the feeling of it
e. emotion; the feeling itself is also actually contributed by them
11. Some bat caves, like honeybee hives, have residents that take on dif-
ferent duties such as defending the entrance, acting as sentinels and to
sound a warning at the approach of danger, and scouting outside the
cave for new food and roosting sites.
a. acting as sentinels and to sound
b. acting as sentinels and sounding
c. to act as sentinels and sound
d. to act as sentinels and to sound
e. to act as a sentinel sounding
Directions: In each of the following antonym questions, pick the word
most nearly OPPOSITE in meaning to the capitalized word.
12. TRANSIENCE:
a. slowness
b. permanence
c. lack of caution
d. desire for perfection
e. original nature
13. FICKLE:
a. spotless
b. industrious
c. welcome
d. urgent
e. loyal
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14. ORTHODOXY:
a. renown
b. trepidation
c. unconventionality
d. inquisitiveness
e. remoteness
15. CREDIT:
a. believe false
b. treat as equal
c. make more diﬃcult
d. underemphasize
e. forget
Directions: Choose the lettered pair of words whose relationship is
MOST LIKE the relationship expressed in the original linked pair.
16. CAPTAIN : SHOAL ::
a. lawyer : litigation
b. pilot : radar
c. soldier : ambush
d. doctor : hospital
e. corporal : sergeant
17. HELMET : HEAD ::
a. pedal : foot
b. gun : hand
c. breastplate : chest
d. pendant : neck
e. knapsack : back
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Directions: Below each sentence are ﬁve words or sets of words. For
each blank, pick the word or set of words that BEST reﬂects the sen-
tence’s overall meaning.
18. Despite the mixture’s . . . . . . nature, we found that by lowering its tem-
perature in the laboratory we could dramatically reduce its tendency
to vaporize.
a. resilient
b. volatile
c. homogeneous
d. insipid
e. acerbic
19. Normally an individual thunderstorm lasts about 45 minutes, but under
certain conditions the storm may . . . . . ., becoming ever more severe,
for as long as four hours.
a. wane
b. moderate
c. persist
d. vacillate
e. disperse
20. Her novel published to universal acclaim, her literary gifts acknowl-
edged by the chief ﬁgures of the Harlem Renaissance, her reputation as
yet . . . . . . by envious slights, Hurston clearly was at the . . . . . . of her
career.
a. undamaged . . . . . . ebb
b. untarnished . . . . . . zenith
c. untainted . . . . . . extremity
d. blackened . . . . . . mercy
e. unmarred . . . . . . brink
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Table 1: Percentage Oﬀers by Treatment and Wealth Level
Wealth Mean Median Oﬀers Between
0% 1 - 49% 50% 51 - 100%
Baseline Dictator Treatment
$10 23.5% 20% 35.00% 35.00% 30.00% 0%
(4.717)
[20]
$20 20.22% 25% 26.09% 60.87% 13.04% 0%
(3.604)
[23]
$40 20% 18.75% 11.11% 77.78% 11.11% 0%
(3.776)
[18]
Receiver Earnings Treatment
$10 27.5% 20% 37.50% 25.00% 25.00% 12.50%
(7.665)
[16]
$20 46% 50% 2.86% 40.00% 25.71% 31.42%
(4.220)
[35]
$40 63.83% 75% 0.00% 15.63% 15.63% 62.86%
(3.663)
[32]
Standard Errors are in parenthesis and number of observations are
in square brackets.
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